I. INTRODUCTION
In a severe influenza pandemic, many more patients would require the use of mechanical ventilators than can be accommodated with current supplies. While federal and state ventilator stockpiles exist and New York state plans to buy additional ventilators that would meet the needs of patients in a moderately severe pandemic,' existing stockpiles would be inadequate to meet the needs of a disaster on the scale of the 1918 influenza pandemic.
2 Even if the vast number of ventilators needed for a disaster of that scale were purchased, the requisite amount of trained healthy staff and other resources, such as oxygen, may not be available due to the nature of the emergency. Consequently, New York State and the rest of the country must proactively confront the rationing of resources in preparation for the possibility of severe ventilator scarcity in an influenza pandemic.
In . 3 The non-binding Guidelines contain a comprehensive clinical and ethical framework to guide distribution of ventilators in the event of a severe public health emergency using objective medical criteria, with the ultimate goal of saving the most lives. This document was among the first in the nation to confront this very sensitive and difficult topic,' and other states have subsequently developed similar allocation plans.' http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/communicable/influenzalpandemic/ventilators/docs/ventilator-guida nce.pdf (hereinafter "Ventilator Guidelines"). The recommendations included requirements that clinical evaluation be based upon universally applied objective criteria and that patients be equally subject to triage guidelines, regardless of their disease category or role in the community. The Ventilator Guidelines also stressed the need for state-wide consistency to prevent inequalities between care facilities, the development of legal protections for providers who comply with the guidelines, and the availability of palliative care.). Notably, and by necessity, the Guidelines represent a significant departure from standard medical practice. In a non-crisis setting, the prevailing medical standard of care focuses on the needs of each individual patient and is centered on the principle of informed consent. In a public health emergency, however, such concentrated care may be impossible or inadvisable due to: (1) resource limitations and (2) the goal of saving as many lives as possible. The Guidelines acknowledge that health care providers may be hesitant to conform to the crisis medical standard of care contained therein due to concerns about liability arising from injury or death.' Adhering to the Guidelines -despite their significant public health goals -may expose health care providers and entities to considerable costs and burdens, including the risk of jail time and/or financial penalties, the time and costs of discovery and preparing a case, higher medical malpractice insurance rates, and damage to one's reputation, unless proper and adequate legal protections are in place.
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This article addresses the issue of liability for health care workers and entities who adhere to the recommended clinical protocol contained in the Ventilator Guidelines while rendering care in a disaster emergency, which has been characterized as one of the "most challenging legal questions related to the pandemic."' After considering in Section II of the "trigger" for implementing emergency plans -a declaration of a public health or disaster emergency -Section III explores current federal and state law that might offer immunity, defense, or indemnification to certain individuals or entities who provide care in response to that declaration. The article then turns in Section IV to a consideration of several unique alternative approaches to mitigate clinicians' and other entities' burdens in the event of a civil lawsuit. Section V addresses issues of potential criminal liability and Section VI culminates in recommendations for legislation granting adequate civil and criminal liability protections to health care workers and entities who adhere to the state's Ventilator Guidelines in a pandemic.
Although this article focuses on New York State law and policy, just as the Ventilator Guidelines served as the basis for other states' scarce resource allocation plans, the issues considered here are applicable in other jurisdictions -just as the clinical and ethical guidance in the Ventilator Guidelines themselves -in order to encourage appropriate behavior in a severe pandemic event.
II. EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
A governmental declaration of a disaster or public health emergency might both signal the applicability of emergency plans and guidelines and make available some liability protections for certain health care workers and entities who provide care during the emergency.! At the federal level, the President of the United States can declare a federal state of emergency or major disaster in accordance with the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ("the Stafford Act")' or the National Emergencies Act." The Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") may also declare a public health emergency in the case of disease, disorder, or bioterrorist attack."
In addition, every state has a procedure for declaring a state of emergency, disaster, or crisis.1 In New York State, the Governor has the authority, pursuant to Article 2-B of the New York State Executive Law ("the Disaster Act")," to declare a state of emergency whenever "a disaster has occurred or may be imminent for which local governments are unable to respond adequately."l 4 The Disaster Act confers certain response duties 8. Emergency declarations may also trigger the availability of resources, such as stockpiles, that are only available in emergencies.
Federal Emergency Management Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 5121-5208 (2000).
10. Declaration of National Emergency by President, 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000) . President Bush declared an emergency under the National Emergencies Act after the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2011). The Secretary declared public heath emergencies
in reaction to the September 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina. 12. In addition to general emergency procedures, some states have protocols for public health emergencies, which trigger various additional powers, including changing the functions of state governmental agencies. New York does not have a public health emergency statute delineated as such, nor is "public health emergency" defined in New York law or administrative regulations. Enacting such a statute might clarify the authority of the Governor and/or Health Commissioner in declaring a crisis medical standard of care or modified immunity standards for health care workers who provide care during an emergency. and obligations on the state in a declared emergency" and includes broad powers to cope with such a crisis. Notably, although the Department of Health has authority over the institutional aspects of medical care and is empowered to issue binding regulations for hospitals that would apply to standards of care, it generally does not have the power to regulate the private practice of medicine.'" The Disaster Act describes the power to issue executive orders, or rules to be followed during the pendency of the emergency;" the governor "may by executive order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations, or parts thereof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency, if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster."' Any suspension of civil or criminal law is valid for thirty days, with an additional possible extension of thirty days.' 9 The ability to suspend relevant laws pursuant to the Disaster Act, however, is limited. First, the Governor may not suspend a law that safeguards public health and welfare that is not "reasonably necessary" to the 
17.
Similarly, in Colorado, a list of draft executive orders has been drafted to be signed and used by the Governor in the event of a public health emergency. The Governor's Expert Emergency Epidemic Response Committee ("GEEERC") was statutorily created in 2000 to develop a public health response to "acts of bioterrorism, pandemic influenza and epidemics caused by novel and highly fatal infectious agents." See 2 2 Third, most civil (including much of the law regarding informed consent, physicianpatient relationships, and medical malpractice) and some criminal liabilities are not detailed by statute but are the product of common law (i.e., case law and precedent), and therefore may not be suspended by the governor pursuant to the Disaster Act. 23 In contrast to statutes, agency regulations and guidelines can be suspended without invocation of the governor's emergency powers.
2 4 An agency may also adopt a temporary emergency rule without normal notice and comment procedures. 25 An agency may not promulgate a rule under the emergency power if it could not promulgate that same rule under normal rule-making procedures, and a notice of emergency adoption mustcite the statutory authority under which the rule is adopted. In planning for a pandemic, it may be useful to identify statutes, 2 9 regulations, and guidelines" that might be suspended in an influenza pandemic, which may conflict with effectively implementing the Ventilator Guidelines."
III. EXISTING CIVIL LIABILITY PROTECTIONS
In adhering to guidelines recommending modified behavior during an emergency, both individuals and entities face potential liability under a number of civil and criminal theories. Civil claims could encompass liability for negligence, professional malpractice, breach of contract, breach LAW § 6509 defines professional misconduct for other professions, as (among other things) "negligence or incompetence on more than one occasion." However, the law allows charges to "be dismissed in the interest of justice," thereby potentially rendering suspension of the law unnecessary. It is also possible that a declaration of a state of emergency may allow the governor to modify or suspend New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (C.P.L.R.) -particularly as they apply to discovery -in order to ameliorate the burden on health care workers who adhere to the Guidelines. However, this proposal is problematic on a number of levels. First, it might be challenging to fit suspension of civil discovery rules into the Disaster Act's requirement that "[n]o suspension shall be made which does not safeguard the health and welfare of the public and which is not reasonably necessary to the disaster effort," because there is little to no instructive case law on what constitutes "reasonably necessary." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 24(1)(g)(2)(ii). Second, the effects of such an order would be subject to the Act's requirement that no suspension be made for a period in excess of thirty days, and -even if extended -would only be in effect during the duration of the declared state of emergency. 30. Guidelines, like those in the draft 2007 report, differ from regulations, which are binding rules or standards promulgated by government agencies (like the New York State Department of Health). Under New York law, a regulation is "a fixed, general principle to be applied by an administrative agency without regard to other facts and circumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme of the statute it administers." In re Suffolk Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. v of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or other intentional torts (including battery). 32 The elements of a negligence claim (the most likely of these civil claims) are: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) harm or injury to the plaintiff, and (4) a causal link between the injury and the breach of duty. 33 The defendant's duty to the plaintiff is defined by the legal standard of care. For personal negligence claims -particularly those based in medical malpractice -against individual physicians, New York courts apply the "prudent doctor standard," requiring that the physician exercise due care, "as measured against the conduct of his or her own peers." 34 The state generally applies the "same community" standard to this determination, wherein the state's case law specifies that practice in the local community determines the standard of care. 35 Moreover, health care providers may be alleged to have committed gross negligence under a crisis standard of care that arises in a pandemic. Under New York law, gross negligence is more than just an egregious form of negligence and can more appropriately be defined as willful misconduct or intentional wrongdoing. Gross negligence differs "in kind, not only degree, from claims of ordinary negligence" and is "conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or 'smacks' of intentional wrongdoing."" With respect to entities -including hospitals, clinics, and health care organizations -claims are likely to sound in corporate negligence and vi- (1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty by deviating from the standard of care; (3) actual or constructive notice of the defects or procedures that caused the harm; and (4) a causal link between the conduct and harm. The entity's duty of care includes maintaining safe and adequate facilities, hiring only competent physicians, overseeing all persons who practice medicine under its auspices, and formulating and enforcing appropriate rules and policies to ensure quality care for patients. A vicarious liability claim may arise against a hospital or other health care entity for the acts of an independent physician where the physician was provided by the hospital or was otherwise acting on the hospital's behalf, and the patient reasonably believed that the physician was acting at the hospital's behest. 39 At both the state and federal level, no uniform legal protection exists for the provision of care pursuant to disaster plans or guidance during a health crisis. For example, although current laws offer some legal safeguards for health care workers and entities, they vary according to the population they cover. Many apply only to unpaid volunteers, 40 while fewer offer protections for compensated health care providers. At best, they provide immunity from a finding of liability. Likewise, the various laws provide different levels of protection: some laws provide civil liability immunity while others indemnify providers. Notably, no federal or New York State law provides immunity from suit altogether. Further, the majority of applicable laws protect providers conditionally (e.g., if the defendant has not engaged in willful or intentional misconduct or gross negligence), rather than offering unconditional protections against liability.
37.
Vicarious liability refers to the responsibility of superiors for the acts of subordinates, and is particularly applicable in the hospital context. 38. Hoffman 40. Broadly, volunteers are health care workers from unaffected areas who may provide assistance in a place of emergency, or retirees or students with medical training who volunteer their services during a declared disaster emergency. "Spontaneous" untrained volunteers are less of a concern in cases concernmg ventilator allocation in a flu pandemic than in dealing with other public health emergencies, and will therefore not be addressed here. See Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1957-58.
A. Federal Law
Two primary pieces of legislation offer some liability protections to health care workers and entities that provide care during a public health emergency: the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness ("PREP") Act and the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 ("VPA").
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act)
Enacted in 2005, the PREP Act limits tort liability under state and federal law with respect to the use of "covered countermeasures" for pandemic flu or other public health threats. 4 ' Specifically, upon a determination by the Secretary of HHS that either a public health emergency or the credible risk of such emergency exists, the Secretary may issue a declaration that certain "covered persons" are immune from liability with respect to claims arising from the administration or use of a covered countermeasure.
4 2 Covered persons will not be held liable unless a "death or serious physical injury" was caused by "willful misconduct." 43 Covered persons include manufacturers, distributors, and program planners of countermeasures (i.e., individuals and entities involved in planning and administering programs for distribution of a countermeasure), as well as qualified persons who prescribe, administer, or dispense countermeasures (i.e., health care and other providers); and theUnited States. To the extent that lifesustaining equipment, such as mechanical ventilators, meets the criteria to be considered covered countermeasures, their appropriate use could qualify a provider for immunity from liability, so long as the providers' activities are part of a response plan and fall within the purview of a declaration by the Secretary of HHS in effect at the time. 44 
Targeted Liability Protections for Pandemic and Epidemic Products and Security Countermeasures, 42

U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2005).
Id.
43. Under the PREP Act, "willful misconduct" is defined as an act or omission that is taken "(i) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh standard is higher than the proof by a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the usual burden of proof in civil cases.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1) (2005). However, the wording of the PREP Act declaration "suggests that liability extends to federal contracts, etc. and activities authorized in response to a public health emergency; requirement of both elements would limit liability to only federal programs and not extend to state programs." CDC Public Health Law Program, After-Action Report: Legal Issues and the HIN1 Influenza However, the scope of the PREP Act is ambiguous.45 As an initial matter, although there is a strong argument that the establishment of a triage protocol for ventilators in a pandemic qualifies as a program for "the administration, dispensing, distribution, provision, or use of a security countermeasure or a qualified pandemic or epidemic product," it remains unclear whether a ventilator would qualify as a covered countermeasure. 46 The PREP Act appears to be designed to insulate manufacturers and entities in the production, supply, and delivery of faulty countermeasures, such as an ineffective or contaminated anti-viral medication, which may have been rushed to market because of a public health emergency. 47 Attempting to apply the PREP Act protections to allocation of a fully-functioning countermeasure such as ventilators is not guaranteed. Additionally, the statutory language of the PREP Act immunizes against affirmative administration of relevant measures; it is unclear whether it would apply equally to inaction regarding such measures. More specifically, the PREP Act protections may not extend to the withholding of a ventilator or other countermeasures pursuant to a state's emergency response plan.
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Accordingly, unless and until the Secretary of HHS approves for PREP Act protection of a plan by New York or another state that includes not only affirmative usage of ventilators, but also withholding or withdrawal of ventilator support, it may be unwise to rely on the PREP Act for full liability protection to ensure compliance with the Guidelines.
Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (VPA)
The VPA provides immunity against liability for tort claims to volunteers who do not receive compensation in excess of $500 per year and who serve governmental entities and nonprofit organizations. 49 However, as with most immunity-conferring laws, the VPA does not cover harm caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer."o The VPA also includes a list of exceptions to the Act's liability limitations, including for crimes of violence or acts of international terrorism, hate crimes, sexual offenses, or violations of federal or state civil rights law." For the VPA's immunity protections to apply, a volunteer must be properly licensed, certified, or authorized by the appropriate state authorities, and the volunteer's activities must be undertaken within the scope of his or her responsibilities. 52 The Act preempts any inconsistent state law, but does not preempt state law that provides additional protection from liability for volunteers." Notably, the VPA's protections do not depend on a declaration of emergency.
The VPA's liability limitations do not apply to nonprofit organizations or governmental entities that may be held vicariously liable for the ordinary negligence of their volunteers, even if volunteers themselves are immune. 54 Moreover, the Act explicitly permits nonprofit organizations or government entities to bring a civil action against the volunteer." Thus, it is entirely possible that an injured person could sue the entity responsible for the volunteer's involvement (under, for example, a vicarious liability theory), and the entity could then, in turn, sue the volunteer to recover the damages it had paid to the victim. Thus, the VPA's immunity provisions do not provide wholesale liability protections to those who provide care in a pandemic and almost certainly does not provide protections for frontline providers, such as hospitalists, for whom the Guidelines are aimed.
B. New York State Law
The Disaster Act, Good Samaritan Laws, and Public Officers Law offer protections -albeit incomplete ones -for health care workers and entities in a pandemic. -Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any civil action brought by any nonprofit organization or any governmental entity against any volunteer of such organization or entity."). 56. In addition, the New York State Defense Emergency Act ("SDEA"), provides a grant of immunity for civil defense workers for actions taken "in good faith carrying out, complying with or attempting to comply with any law, any rule, regulation or order duly promulgated or issued pursuant to" the SDEA and "relating to civil defense, including but not limited to activities pursuant thereto, in preparation for anticipated attack, during attack, or following attack or false warning thereof, or in connection with an authorized drill or test." Importantly, because issues of malpractice and other liability are not detailed bystate statute," the state may not be able to provide additional liability protectionto health care providers based on the declaration of an emergency by order alone." Moreover, no state action would insulate health care workers from liability for breaches of federal law. For example, state action could not protect health care workers from alleged HIPAA or EMTALAo violations. Liability under federal law can be waived only by a declaration of a national public health emergency by the President or the Secretary of HHS. 6 1 Likewise, constitutional claims alleging violations of due process, equal protection, or takings law would not be addressed by an application of state law as a result of a state declaration of emergency.
The Disaster Act
In addition to permitting the governor to declare a state of emergency, New York's Disaster Act grants civil immunity to actions taken by certain individuals "for any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of any officer or employee in carrying out" the law. 62 Courts have held that in enacting the statute, the legislature intended to grant only im-N.Y. LAW § 113 (CONSOL. 2012). The immunity provision also extends to government, partnerships, and corporations, as well as individuals. Although the governor may invoke the SDEA following an "attack," pandemics are considered relatively foreseeable and would probably not qualify under the SDEA. munity from liability -not immunity from suit. 63 In other words, covered parties can still be sued and forced to go to court for civil liability allegations that arise out of care provided in a declared emergency, but the Disaster Act may prevent a finding of liability. Liability protections also would be unlikely to extend beyond political subdivisions and their employees and officers; at least one court has opined that "[h]ad the legislature intended for immunity to extend to private [compensated nongovernment] actors, it could easily have so provided."' Recently, the Disaster Act's immunity provisions were modified to also apply to local "affiliated" volunteers acting within the scope of duties set forth in a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, to the extent that a formal "affiliation" has been established." It is unclear whether the Act would cover clinicians' conduct if their actions occurred within the normal scope of duties. Paradoxically, such clinicians would be the exact health care providers who would likely be sued for following the Guidelines.
New York State Good Samaritan Laws
Under New York's Good Samaritan laws, physicians, physician assistants, dentists, physical therapists, nurses, and podiatrists who provide care at the scene of an accident or emergency are immune from civil liability claims.
However, such laws apply only to care provided outside a hospital, doctor's office, or other place having proper and necessary medical equipment.6 Moreover, the state's Good Samaritan laws apply to only voluntary and uncompensated individuals, and not to professionals acting in the context of their normal duties or with a pre-established duty of care to the patient." Consequently, Good Samaritan laws exclude a major por- (applying non-liability to licensed physicians providing voluntary and uncompensated first aid or emergency treatment at the scene of an accident or other emergency outside a hospital, doctor's office, or any other place having proper and necessary medical equipment, to a person who is unconscious, ill, or injured), Id.
at § 6547 (stating that a physician assistant rendering first aid or emergency treatment at the scene of an accident or outside a hospital or doctor's office is not liable for damages, injuries, or death unless it is established that the injuries or death are caused by gross negligence), Id. at § 6737 (applying non-liability for licensed physical therapists for first aid or emergency treatment), Id. at § 6909 (applying non-liability for nurses for providing uncompensated first aid or emergency treatment), Id at § 7006 (applying non-liability for podiatrists for providing uncompensated first aid or emergency treatment), Id Under Section 17, the State's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. The law requires New York State to provide for the defense of its employees "in any civil action or proceeding in any state or federal court arising out of any alleged act or omission which occurred or is alleged in the complaint to have occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment or duties. requires the state to provide indemnity to employees of public state entities acting within the scope of public employment or duties unless the damages "resulted from intentional wrongdoing." 4 If a judgment is entered against such an individual, the state must indemnify and hold harmless him or her in the amount of any judgment or settlement. In these cases, his or her primary malpractice insurance would be responsible to pay the judgment, and to the extent that one has no insurance or the insurance is exhausted, the State would cover the individual for the difference.
Amendment of Public Officers Law Section 17 to require the defense or indemnification of all health care providers in actions arising from their adherence to the Guidelines, whether or not employed by the state or participating in a state-sponsored volunteer program, might encourage health care workers to follow the clinical protocols proposed for ventilator allocation in an influenza pandemic.
However, defense or indemnification or both -without immunitymay be inadequate to convince health care workers to follow the Ventilator Guidelines. Health care providers against whom a claim is brought would still be required to endure the time and burdens associated with a lawsuit. Likewise, health care providers' reputations would suffer because identities of providers named in malpractice settlements or payments must be reported to a national data bank." Moreover, such an expansion of the state's obligations under Section 17, without any immunity for the newlycovered defendants, would expose the state to potentially enormous unbudgeted costs.
Federal and New York State Law Offers Inadequate Liability Protections
In summary, existing liability protections are a patchwork of federal and state law, which provides limited immunity from civil liability for volunteers. The laws' civil indemnity and defense protections are more extensive than civil immunity protections, and their civil liability protections are much more extensive than their criminal liability protections. Moreover, liability protections are broader for individuals than for entities. New York's piecemeal and varied approach to providing liability protections for health care providers and entities in a disaster emergency is inadequate. The Disaster Act does not immunize private health care workers; the Good Samaritan laws do not immunize health care providers within hospitals or compensated actors with a prior duty of care to the patient; and Public Officers Law Section 17 does not provide defense or indemnification to those who are not state employees or volunteers expressly authorized to participate in a state-sponsored volunteer program." In the majority of cases, New York State laws will not apply to those who will be called upon to provide care pursuant to the Guidelines -those who are privately employed in a hospital with a preexisting duty of care to patients." Compensated health care providers who continue to perform their professional responsibilities during a declared emergency constitute "an often ignored segment of the responder population. 77. See Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1917, 1959 (arguing that "exclusion of paid workers and entities from immunity protection is imprudent because it creates barriers to effective emergency response initiatives..." and "raises important questions of justice," and recommending legislation ensuring that "health care providers will not be liable for injuries or harm caused by good-faith actions undertaken in order to respond to a public health emergency so long as they are acting in their capacity as employers or employees in the affected area or volunteering under the direction of governmental authorities or nonprofit organizations, and are not engaged in willful misconduct, gross negligence, or criminal activity."). 78. Id at 1917. In contrast, Virginia provides arguably the most extensive immunity protections in the United States, including offering protections to health care workers in a declared state of emergency, regardless of pay. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2011) ("In the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, any health care provider who responds to a disaster shall not be liable for any injury or wrongful immunity and indemnity is insufficient to protect those health care workers and entities who "bear the brunt of the burden" in delivering care during a disaster emergency.
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IV. REGULATION OR LEGISLATION?
Law and regulations, due to their static and binding nature, are not an ideal delivery system for clinically-detailed recommendations, particularly in rapidly-changing circumstances, such as a pandemic. Consequently, voluntary, non-binding guidelines based on "sound ethical and clinical principles" would be the best means of ensuring an effective ventilator allocation system, while avoiding unforeseen consequences.so Accordingly, New York chose to issue its draft recommendations for ventilator allocation in the form of guidelines. However, while guidelines recommending modifications to the standards for the normal delivery of care may be optimal for purposes of flexibility and tailoring clinical behavior to the precise nature of the disaster, they afford the least amount of legal protection to practitioners because of their non-binding nature.
If a pandemic were to occur today, health care providers and entities in New York would have limited recourse if sued for adhering to the Ventilator Guidelines. However, proof of compliance with the Guidelines might still constitute presumptive (rebuttable) or non-conclusive evidence of the legal standard of care -a defense to a claim of negligence."' Guidelines for appropriate treatment protocols during public health emergencies death of any person arising from the delivery or withholding of health care when (i) a state or local emergency has been or is subsequently declared in response to such disaster, and (ii) the emergency and subsequent conditions caused a lack of resources, attributable to the disaster, rendering the health care provider unable to provide the level or manner of care that otherwise would have been required in the absence of the emergency and which resulted in the injury or wrongful death at issue.") (emphasis added). Commentators in other states have advocated for using Virginia developed by organizations may be "useful in litigation for the purpose of determining whether health professionals acted appropriately and are entitled to immunity." 8 2 Thus, the Guidelines may serve as departmentally promulgated "soft law,", 3 providing strong evidence of an established standard of care that could reasonably be expected of health care providers in a disaster emergency. 84 Such deference to professional standards of conduct in the form of policies, codes, and guidelines is not without precedent. 85 For years, tort reformers have argued for the use of clinical practice guidelines ("CPGs") as evidence of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases." In response, some states have legislated that guidance developed by expert consensus demonstrate, or are evidence of, the standard of care in civil liability cases." 82. Hoffman he prevailing practice is to admit CPGs in connection with expert testimony, but not to give them determinative weight."). Mello provides a useful summary of the various proposals for giving guidelines a greater role in negligence litigation, including the "contract model," the "judicial notice model" (which proposes that courts take judicial notice of CPGs as representing the legal standard of care), and the "Maine model." Id. From 1992 until 1996, a Maine statutory demonstration project created an absolute affirmative defense to medical malpractice claims for physicians who demonstrated compliance with specific practice guidelines. 24 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § § 2971-2979 (repealed 1999).
Likewise, some state courts allow industry codes and standards to be admitted in support of a defense to medical malpractice. Many states, including New York, recognize these codes and standards as probative -not conclusive -evidence on the issue of the defendant's duty." New York courts have held that, even with evidence that a health care provider complied with state guidelines, there may still be an issue regarding whether the proper standard of care has been met. 89 Thus, demonstrating that a health care provider or entity followed the Guidelines would only constitute evidence of meeting the standard of care, but would not insulate that individual or entity from suit." Moreover, although guidelines may be evidence of the standard of care or may serve as an affirmative defense in negligence proceedings, courts may be unwilling to hold that declining to follow them would amount to gross negligence or professional misconduct. 9 1 Kentucky's statute, which is still in effect, protects physicians who follow CPG protocols that have been Any provider of medical services under this chapter who has followed the practice parameters or guidelines developed or adopted pursuant to this subsection shall be presumed to have met the appropriate legal standard of care in medical malpractice cases regardless of any unanticipated complication that may thereafter develop or be discovered."). Draft Massachusetts guidelines also suggest that reliance on guidance will serve as evidence of having met the crisis standard of care and state that an individual patient to whom an approved crisis standard of care is provided should have no basis to assert in a medical malpractice claim against the health care provider that an appropriate level of care was not provided. Levin, supra note 58, at S138 ("Moreover, the [health care provider], having met the requisite standard of care, should not be held liable in a malpractice action based on the provision of care in accordance with an approved" crisis standard of care). Guidelines for Office-Based Surgery were null and void because they are, in fact, regulations, promulgated outside of the Department's authority. Despite the Supreme Court and Appellate Division both holding that the guidelines were regulations and that their promulgation was outside the scope of the Department's authority, the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed for lack of standing, without reaching the merits of the substantive claim.
See Bailey v. Bakers Air Force Gas
V. APPROACHES TO MITIGATING CIVIL LIABILITY
Recognizing the dearth of existing protections for health care providers and entities that adhere to the Guidelines, there are a number of possible approaches to providing protections from civil liability. Legislation conferring immunity upon health care providers and entities that provide care in a pandemic pursuant to the Guidelines may offer the most protection, and therefore, be most effective in encouraging compliance with the ventilator allocation protocol. However, various additional options -implemented either alone or in combination with each other -merit consideration as approaches to mitigating civil liability.
A. Immunity-Conferring Legislation
Guidelines, such as the Ventilator Allocation Guidelines, recommend shifting scarce resources in order to save the most lives possible, rather than focusing on the individual. 92 It is well understood that the provision and scope of care may reasonably change according to the circumstances of a disaster. 93 However, in an emergency, the declaration of a modified medical standard of care may enable health care providers to more easily demonstrate that they met the requisite level of care in order to avoid civil liability. http://www.naccho.org/topics/HINI/upload/043010-HINI-Legal-Issues-After-Action-Report.pdf (identifying the "[njecessity of term "Crisis" or "Altered" Standards of Care for medical professionals during a public health emergency" and the "legal authority for standards of care" as outstanding legal issues to be addressed); Mareiniss, supra note 93, at 332 (focusing on the flexibility of the legal standard of care because informed consent would be violated when providers proceeded with the "unconsented" reallocation of ICU resources in a pandemic).
health care providers and entities who follow the Guidelines, coupled with the declaration of a crisis medical standard of care, would facilitate consistency in application and enable the avoidance of unpredictable outcomes when legal disputes occur." Thus, official public state acknowledgment of a crisis standard of care in an emergency would ensure forethought in decision-making and consistency in the application of the Guidelines, as well as ease the burden on health care workers who seek to prove non-negligent behavior after the disaster has passed.
New, clear legislation that provides reduced liability is the most effective way to protect practitioners who follow the Guidelines." Because the Guidelines themselves are purely advisory and do not carry the force of law," legislation could render adherence conclusive (irrebuttable) evidence of compliance with the standard of care, potentially serving as the basis for a dismissal of the complaint without trial. Therefore, this approach would maintain the voluntary nature of the clinical guidelines in combination with the promulgation of immunity-conferring legislation to protect health care workers and entities."
Legislation extending liability protections should include limitations like a good faith requirement and exclusions for certain acts of gross neg- vider who responds to a disaster shall not be liable for any injury or wrongful death of any person arising from the delivery or withholding of health care when . . . the emergency and subsequent conditions caused a lack of resources, attributable to the disaster, rendering the health care provider unable to provide the level or manner of care that otherwise would have been required in the absence of the emergency and which resulted in the injury or wrongful death at issue.") (emphasis added). Virginia's law was crafted to establish a crisis standard of care and confer immunity on health care providers based on this standard. 97. "If there were to be fixed standards in regulations for physician [private practice], there would need to be some enforcement mechanisms in order to ensure compliance." Greenberg, Statutory and Regulatory Authority Over Office-Based Surgery, supra note 90. Thus, if Department-issued guidelines were to amount to a "fixed, general principle," they would be considered improperly promulgated regulations be- ligence or willful misconduct. 99 However, arguably, immunity-conferring statutes that exempt "willful misconduct" may not adequately protect health care providers who remove ventilator therapy from a patient consistent with state-promulgated guidelines. Such an act might be considered to be willful or in conscious disregard of the safety of the individual harmed and therefore beyond the protective scope of the law.' 0 Thus, special consideration should be given to ensure that any immunityconferring legislation does not limit the ability for any individual or hospital to withdraw certain medical equipment pursuant to the Guidelines.
However, such legislation may be practically and politically difficult to realize, particularly without identification of the scope of behavior that it is intended to protect. Moreover, it would not insulate health care workers from liability for breaches of federal law or federal constitutional claims alleging violations of due process, equal protection, or takings law.
B. Caps on Damages
Legislation imposing a cap on damages in liability cases arising out of declared emergencies (or for those who, in particular, abide by the Guidelines) could offer some protections for health care workers, thereby encouraging adherence to the Guidelines. Commentators have noted that damages caps "have been found to generate small increases in the supply of physicians," which demonstrates that "diminished concerns about liability are associated with greater willingness on the part of individuals to serve as health care providers.""' Many states have already instituted damages caps in liability cases arising out of malpractice claims generally.' 02 However, some states -but not New York -have found caps on noneconomic damages to be unconstitutional. 3 The subject of damages 99. In most states that confer liability protections in an emergency, their laws shield health care workers from negligence liability, but not gross negligence. But see Mareiniss, supra note 93, at 333 (noting that Black's Law Dictionary "defines willful, reckless, wanton, and gross negligence as acts that are intentionally done despite the known risk that it is 'highly probable that harm will follow'). 100. Mareiniss, supra note 93, at 333. 101. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1956. .2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (finding that the $875,000 cap on none-caps in New York has been the subject of much debate, although the state currently has no applicable statute imposing any damage award limits or caps in tort suits." Nevertheless, despite the resistance to damages caps for medical malpractice cases arising out of routine care, it may be more palatable to institute them for care provided in emergency situations.
C. Expedited Discovery and Statutes of Limitations
Under existing law, it is within the discretion of the court to set the schedule for discovery.'s In order to ease the burden on individuals and entities who comply with the Ventilator Guidelines, courts could expedite the initial phase of discovery in tort suits arising out of circumstances related to a public health disaster and limit discovery to the production of evidence that the Guidelines were followed.' 0 ' New legislation could require New York State courts to exercise their power to order discovery to take place in stages, limiting initial discovery to the issue of compliance with the standard of care applicable in a disaster emergency where the Guidelines were followed. The health care provider or entity defendant could then move for summary judgment or dismissal before being required to undergo further discovery on additional issues.
Instead of requiring that discovery occur in stages, courts could alternatively limit discovery in tort claims arising from a state of declared which an itemized verdict is required by rule forty-one hundred eleven of this chapter in which it is contended that the award is excessive or inadequate and that a new trial should have been granted unless a stipulation is entered to a different award, the appellate division shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation"). 
106.
The cases disputing the contours of Governor Pataki's Section 30.30 suspension in response to September 1 Ith give rise to a consideration of what is within the Governor's authority in suspending or modifying certain civil and criminal trial rules. It would seem that changing the discovery rules to streamline or eliminate certain burdens may not always be an available approach. However, extending the discovery period to allow for delays due to a declared emergency may be within the governor's authority. emergency. In most state and federal courts, the discovery rules are based on the rules of evidence, which often require a basic balancing test to determine whether discovery may be limited.' New York civil practice law and rules require "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof."' Alternatively, the statute of limitations for instituting legal action for negligence claims arising out of care rendered during a declared health emergency may be shortened. In New York, the existing statute of limitations for instituting a medical malpractice claim, regardless of the circumstances out of which the claim arises, is 2.5 years.' 09 Shortening this time period for actions arising out of an emergency may lessen the number of health care providers who must defend against a lawsuit.
Thus, although modification of the discovery process and statutes of limitation would provide neither immunity nor indemnity to health care providers and entities, it might lessen the time and resources they expend when defending a suit by diminishing the likelihood of suit, shortening the length of the process, and permitting the dismissal of time-barred actions.
D. Alternative Resolution Procedures
The use of alternative dispute resolution procedures and the establishment of substituted methods of handling civil liability suits that might arise from adhering to the Ventilator Guidelines could also ease the potential burdens of litigation on both health care providers and the court sys-107. In the context of electronically stored information ("ESI"), for example, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court has the power to limit discovery "if the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." FED. R. Ctv. P. 26. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules have not been modified as the Federal Rules have to address the balancing of burden versus benefit. The Joint Committee has proposed that the advisory notes to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3103 (McKinney 2012) be amended to include the same language as FED. R. Ctv. P. 26. The new language would allow a New York court dealing with an ESI discovery dispute to consider "whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving those issues. tem. Claims related to health care provided during an emergency could be: (1) settled by arbitration; (2) subject to pretrial review panels; or (3) ameliorated by covering injuries with monies gathered in a compensation pool in lieu of instituting suit. Each approach has advantages and limitations.
Arbitration
Arbitration is generally less expensive, time-consuming, and burdensome than litigation, although there is conflicting evidence regarding whether arbitration leads to more frequent findings of liability and higher damages awards than litigation."' 0 Arbitration may not lead to fewer proplaintiff judgments or lower damages, but there is reason to believe that it would decrease transaction costs and certain burdens associated with litigation, particularly those associated with longer discovery periods."'
Although no state has yet adopted an arbitration board to review cases arising out of pandemics or other emergencies,l 2 New York could legislatively require cases arising out of circumstances associated with a declared disaster emergency to be subject to binding arbitration. Importantly, however, courts have noted the crucial distinction between voluntary and compulsory arbitration, the latter of which is particularly subject to constitutional attacks. Although compulsory binding arbitration is not per se unconstitutional," in some cases it may violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trialll 4 and/or impinge on due process guaran- 15 Commentators have noted that "the paucity of decisions" regarding the legality of compulsory arbitration "in cases involving such statutes bars the formulation of any general rule as to their constitutionality.""' New York courts have found that compulsory binding arbitration is constitutional, but the arbitrator's determination must be subject to "closer judicial scrutiny"than for determinations made in voluntary arbitration.'" For example, courts have held that the legislature can, in the interest of public health and welfare,requirethe settlement of labor disputes in nonprofit hospitals through compulsory and binding arbitration, provided there is substantive and procedural due process of law."' Courts have also held that New York's new car "lemon law," which establishes a compulsory arbitration process, satisfies the minimal requirements of due process, because litigants are entitled to receive judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard enunciated in New York civil procedural rules.1'
The easiest way to avoid constitutional attacks would be to allow on- ly voluntary arbitration (thereby avoiding the jury trial issue) with review de novo in the courts (thereby avoiding the due process issue).120 However, this would obviate the advantages of binding arbitration, as any frustrated party could appeal the decision. In order to preserve the benefits of arbitration, it is important that it be considered "binding" so that the ability to challenge the decision is limited.
'
Pretrial Review Panels
Legislation requiring that claims be reviewed by a panel for merit before they are allowed to proceed to litigation is an alternative similar to nonbinding arbitration. Many (if not most) states require a medical review panel determination before the parties can proceed to trial in a medical malpractice case. For example, in Indiana, unless the claimant seeks damages below $15,000, an action against a health care provider may not be commenced before the claimant's proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel and that panel has issued an opinion.
122 Nebraska requires that medical review panels review all malpractice claims against health care providers covered by the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act in advance of filing a civil action.' 23 The claimant may affirmatively waive his or her right to a panel review, and in such case the claimant may proceed to file his or her action directly in court. 124 New York, in contrast, has no pretrial screening procedure. expert opinions which shall be in writing and mailed to each of the parties: (a) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint in specified particulars; (b) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant involved met the applicable standard of care required under the circumstances; or (c) There is a material issue of fact, not requiring expert opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court or jury in specified particulars."
Pretrial screening panels could serve as a filter, reviewing claims before a suit is filed and permitting only meritorious claims to proceed to litigation. The establishment of a special panel, particularly if comprised of individuals familiar with disaster medicine protocols and New York's Ventilator Guidelines, might serve as an effective screening mechanism which could potentially ease the burden on health care workers who render care pursuant to the Guidelines in a flu pandemic. However, the use of review boards would require convening a group of specialized volunteers willing to review a potentially large number of cases and identifying where funding will come to hire and pay reviewers.
Compensation Pools
Establishment of a non-judicial compensation pool for use as a nofault method of claim settlement might decrease the likelihood of litigation and lessen the burden on potential litigants.' 25 Individuals injured due to a health care provider's or entity's adherence to the Guidelines would seek redress through the fund in lieu of bringing suit.
The effective use of both federal and other states' compensation pools might serve as a model for one in New York State. For example, the PREP Act provides for the establishment of an emergency fund designed to compensate aggrieved individuals for certain injuries associated with the "covered countermeasures" addressed in the statute.' 26 An aggrieved individual can either "accept the compensation or. . . bring an action under" the PREP Act, but cannot do both. Similarly, other federal compensation programs have been established to immunize private parties, while eliminating the claimant's right to sue. The 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act established that claims for injuries are first decided by the "Vaccine Court" (the Court of Federal Claims).' 27 The statute prohibits suits under state tort law against manufacturers and administrators of specified vaccines unless the claimant first files a claim for limited no-fault compensation (e.g., a $250,000 cap on pain and suffering) with the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which is administered by a director selected by the Secretary of HHS. Claims are paid by the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund, which is funded by a tax on vaccines. New York State could set up a compensation pool similar to the federal and state funds described above for injuries arising out of adherence to the Ventilator Guidelines during a declared state of disaster emergency." However, claimants seeking larger payouts might still choose to pursue litigation unless compensation pools were made the exclusive remedy. Moreover, it has been argued that creation of such a fund in the (very likely) instance of scarce resources in a pandemic could divert money and personnel from "providing care and conducting rescue, recovery, and rebuilding operations."' 36 Nor is it clear how such a fund would be sustained.
E. Judge, Court, and Attorney Education
Although the New York Department of Health may intend for the Guidelines to establish the medical standard of care in a pandemic emergency, courts will not necessarily agree."' Thus, special education, via Continuing Legal Education ("CLE") and Continuing Judicial Education ("CJE"), for judges, attorneys, and others who participate in the legal system may be necessary. Educating these professionals about the laws, guidelines, and policies that pertain to the provision of care in a declared emergency may better prepare them to consider and argue for crisis standards of care, provide tailored jury instructions and charges regarding appropriate conduct in an emergency, and perhaps reduce the liability risk to health care workers who provide care pursuant to the Guidelines.
New York State has already taken a step in this direction: a February 2010 New York State Bar Association CLE publication provides guidance for managing future public health disasters."' A number of other states have also published "bench books" -compilations of materials for use by courts in the wake of pandemic influenza -to educate court employees (and specifically, judges) on resolving disputes that arise in a public health emergency, particularly with regard to issues regarding isolation and quar-136. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 1968. 137. New York common law allows for the consideration of the reasonableness of an individual's conduct when confronted with a sudden emergency situation. The common law emergency doctrine "recognizes that when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context." Rivera v. N.Y City Tr. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 322, 327 (1991). In such cases, the judge may provide special instructions to the jury that it may consider the reasonableness of a party's conduct in light of the unexpected emergency confronting that person. However, it should be noted that this doctrine has been "somewhat eroded by the evolution from contributory negligence to comparative negligence" in New York courts. Id. at 335. antine and determination of jurisdiction and venue."' Although most of these bench books do not address crisis standards of care, specific jury instructions, or other issues relevant to the allocation of scarce resources during a pandemic, they do provide a model for educating court employees for dealing with difficult emergency situations.' 40 Similarly, attorney education about the standard of care in a disaster emergency for providers and entities who follow the Guidelines would prepare hospital and physician insurance carrier attorneys, health care provider defense attorneys, and others to argue to judges and juries about the proper legal standard of care in the context of cases as they arise.
New York State Public Health Legal
VI. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Recent events have underscored the need for systematic protection of health care providers and entities who follow a modified medical standard of care in a public health emergency. An oft-cited case illustrates the significance of providing criminal protections for health care workers who render care in a declared emergency. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Dr. Anna Maria Pou was arrested for the alleged murder of four elderly patients for whom she had provided palliative care at New Orleans' Memorial Medical Center, providing them with allegedly lethal dosages of morphine and midazolam so that they would not suffer pain. 41 Although the grand jury declined to indict her on the murder counts, the threat of criminal liability will likely discourage other physicians, nurses, and health care professionals from deviating from standard non-emergency medical practice, even if done pursuant to state guidance, in a future emergency.
Because criminal liability must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," the standard for finding a health care provider guilty of criminal behavior is quite high.1 42 Regardless, this high burden of proof does not shield health care workers from prosecution. Thus, complying with the Guidelines in a severe pandemic could give rise to criminal liability claims by patients (or their families), particularly where health care workers withheld access to ventilators or extubated patients.' 43 Although legislative action could protect health care providers from criminal liability where they have appropriately followed the Guidelines, instituting protections for health care providers from criminal liability could be even more difficult than establishing broader civil liability protections, due to concerns about inadvertently sheltering intentional misconduct.
Currently, no New York law provides criminal immunity to health care providers in a state of emergency.1 4 4 In fact, only a handful of states provide criminal liability protections to health care providers during a disaster.1 45 Although New York law does not confer immunity to providers and entities who provide care during a declared disaster emergency, New York State Public Officers Law Section 19 authorizes reimbursement for criminal defense expenses incurred by an "employee" -defined similarly to Section 17, although without the extension of Section 14 -in his or her defense of a criminal proceeding "arising out of any act which occurred while such employee was acting within the scope of his public employment or duties upon his acquittal or upon the dismissal of the criminal charges against him."' 4 6 The attorney general is empowered to determine, after investigation and review of the facts and circumstances of the criminal proceeding, whether the application for reimbursement should be granted. Thus, Section 19 is less extensive than Section 17, both in the protections it offers and who it protects. Further, as with Section 17, Section 19 may be inadequate to convince health care workers to follow the Ventilator Guidelines because it would not eliminate the burdens of a lawsuit.
It has been suggested that guidance from organizations (or, in this case, the Task Force and New York Department of Health) could be useful in criminal litigation for determining whether health care providers acted appropriately.' 47 However, evidence of reliance on the Guidelines would only serve as exculpatory evidence and therefore would not insulate a health care provider from criminal prosecution.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATION
Legislation granting at least civil (if not also criminal) liability protections to all health care workers and entities who follow New York State's Ventilator Guidelines in an influenza pandemic would provide the greatest assurance against liability and eliminate the patchwork approach to liability protections currently in effect. The establishment of binding immunity-conferring rules would go a long way toward encouraging physicians, nurses, and other health care workers, as well as hospitals and other health care entities, to comply with the Guidelines.' 4 8
Any legislation granting immunity to health care providers and entities that adhere to the Ventilator Guidelines should strike a balance between safeguarding patients and protecting all health care workers and entities. In particular, it should give special consideration to limitations such as good faith requirements and exclusions for certain acts of gross negligence or willful misconduct. Further, any legislation should eliminate the line between compensated employees, independent contractors, and unpaid or paid volunteers and should apply to all situations in which caregivers adhere to the Guidelines, regardless of the setting.' 4 9 Finally, liability protections should not be limited to only those health care workers who follow the clinical protocol presented in the Guidelines; protection should be extended to all those who provide, in good faith and in the absence of gross negligence, care in a disaster emergency."so In the absence of legislation conferring full immunity, states should in the least consider the alternative approaches discussed in Section V to mitigate costs and burdens of lawsuits. While these protections are certainly less comprehensive than immunity-conferring legislation, they may be more politically palatable, and would have substantial impact on encouraging clinicians to adhere to triage protocols necessary to promote survival of the greatest number of people during a pandemic. Although the discussion in this article focused primarily on New York State law and policy, its analysis and recommendations may be extrapolated to other states and jurisdictions, in an effort to encourage compliance with local, state, and federal disaster plans and guidance.
149. This may also obviate Mark Rothstein's concern that immunizing only volunteers would create a distinction between (wealthy) patients of non-volunteer physicians and (indigent) patients of volunteer physicians in their access to legal recourse if they are harmed by substandard medical care. Rothstein, supra note 93, at 151-52. 150. No state has explicitly conferred liability protections for certain specified classes of actions taken by health care workers during an emergency, but instead they generally provide general protections for any care provided in good faith and in the absence of gross negligence. care provider or other person who in good faith follows the instructions of the state health officer in responding to the public health emergency is immune from any liability arising from complying with those instructions," excluding "acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct . .
